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One Pillar: Legal Authority and a Social
License to Operate in a Global Context
HANS LINDAHL*
ABSTRACT

The claim that businesses have a social license to operate acquires
concrete form in the second pillar of the U.N. Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) in the fundamental distinction
between "compliance with all applicable laws" and "respect for human
rights." The aim of this paper is to critically examine the presuppositions
that undergird this distinction and to explain how and why moving
beyond state-centered thinking about law, in response to violations of
human rights by globally operating businesses, requires acknowledging
that there is one pillar that embraces states and businesses: the legal
obligation to comply with internationalhuman rights law. Arguing that
legal order can best be conceptualized as authoritativecollective action,
the paper develops the one-pillar thesis along two fronts. The first argues
that there can be no credible social license to operate in a global context
absent authorities that uphold and regulatejoint action as regards what
is to count as a global collective's bounded common good and as its
bounded common place. Yet, it is this authoritativedimension of a social
license to operate that the UNGPs preclude by proclaiming that the
corporate responsibility to respect human rights does not itself create a
legal obligation. The second argues that both states and globally
operating businesses are legal orders in their own right. From the firstperson plural perspective of authoritatively mediated collective action,
nothing justifies separatinga state's obligation to uphold human rights,
as per the first pillar of the UNGPs, from a business's responsibility to
respect human rights, as per the second pillar.
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INTRODUCTION

The opening statement of the United Nations Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) indicates that "business
enterprises [are] specialized organs of society performing specialized
functions."' It is no exaggeration to suggest that the key challenge
confronting the UNGPs-even the central problem summarized by the
expression "business and human rights"-is enclosed in this seemingly
straightforward expression. How does one make sense of, and lend
traction to, the preposition "of' in the term "specialized organs of
society"? At stake is not merely an abstract relation of dependency
between society and businesses; the commentary to the second pillar of
the UNGPs spells out the meaning of this preposition when averring
that businesses are to have a "social license to operate." In other words,
at issue is nothing less than the authorization of businesses and their
operations, such that society can view businesses as its own organs and
their functions and activities as its own functions and activities.
I argue in this paper that the key to this question lies in the
connection between the two distinctions that have been the
unquestioned presupposition of a social license to operate in the
framework of what might be called "territorial human rights
government": the public/private and inside/outside distinctions. Indeed,
economic globalization has put pressure on both distinctions and on
their connection as a result of the privatization and marketization of
public authority and the enormous growth of cross-border activities,
which increasingly elude the de jure and de facto control of states. The
moniker "global human rights governance" suggests that the conceptual
and institutional challenge confronting a theory of authority in a global
context is to reconstruct the notion of publicness in a global context in a
way that need not rely on the inside/outside distinction. Indeed, general
wisdom has it that a credible social license to operate in the context of
economic globalization requires the emergence of institutions that can
articulate a global public good that is no longer spatially bounded.
Despite its apparent novelty, this assumption actually entrenches a
understanding of the inside/outside
thoroughly state-centered
distinction. While endorsing the thesis that a social license to operate in
a global context requires the emergence of institutionally mediated
representations of the global public good, the paper also holds that there
can be no such good-hence no credible social license to operate in a
global context-absent a spatial closure whereby global society closes

1. U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights 1, HRJPUB/1/04 (2011).
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itself into an inside vis-&-vis an outside. The relation between authority
and place is necessary, not contingent. Contrasting the UNGPs to the
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the paper argues, in
conclusion, that the real question raised by "global human rights
governance" is not how to move beyond the inside/outside distinction in
the face of cross-border activity but rather how to conceptualize and
institutionalize the connection between these two distinctions in a
global context, such that businesses, multinational corporations in
particular, are under a legal duty to comply with human rights law.
I. GLOBAL CHALLENGES TO TERRITORIAL HUMAN RIGHTS GOVERNMENT

The claim that businesses are to have a social license to operate
acquires concrete form in the second pillar of the UNGPs in the
fundamental distinction between compliance with all applicable laws
and respect for human rights. 2 As the UNGPs make abundantly clear,
the latter does not create a legal obligation, nor does it in principle give
victims of human rights abuses by business enterprises legal standing
to demand redress for such breaches. 3 To the extent that there is a legal
obligation to respect human rights, and to the extent that such
obligations give rise to legal remedies, businesses and their operations
fall squarely within the first term of the distinction: compliance with all
applicable laws. This is not to say that the demand that businesses
respect human rights is without any "force"; it is to say that its force is
the force of "social expectations" and the consequences that might ensue
when such expectations are disappointed.
At one level, this distinction means that human rights can function
either as legal or as social norms, a typology that was already well
established in the heyday of territorial government. 4 At a deeper level,
however, the distinction reflects the profound transformation that has
taken place in the passage from what scholars dub "territorial
government" to "global governance." 5 In fact, the very idea that
businesses require a "social"-rather than a state-license to operate
2. Id. at 13.
3. The General Principles of the UNGPs note, amongst others, that "[n]othing in
these Guiding Principles should be read as creating new international law obligations, or
as limiting or undermining any legal obligations a State may have undertaken or be
subject to under international law with regard to human rights." Id. at 1.
4. For a good survey of theories of social norms, see Cristina Bicchieri and Ryan
Muldoon, Social Norms, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
social-norms/ (last updated Mar. 20, 2014).
5. See JAMES N. RoSENAU & ERNST-OTTO CZEMPIEL, GOVERNANCE WITHOUT
GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 272 (1992).
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precisely captures the nature of the transformation and the difficulties
it calls forth. To put it crudely, whereas "compliance with all applicable
laws" signals the extent to which businesses and their operations
continue to fall within the orbit of territorial government, "respect for
human rights" is a specific interpretation of what it means that
businesses and their operations now also fall under the aegis of global
governance.
It is tempting to ask whether respect for human rights, as laid out
in the second pillar of the UNGPs, is consistent with a credible sense of
a social license to operate. But I will postpone dealing with this
question. For the fundamental question we must address first is the
concept of law that would be appropriate to understand why businesses
might-and should-be legally bound by human rights law in their
global operations. In effect, it is of crucial importance to understand and
critically probe the double distinction that governs the UNGPs in their
entirety. Generally, the UNGPs distinguish between states and
businesses, addressing the relation between states and human rights in
the first pillar and the relation between businesses and human rights in
the second. It is on the basis of this cardinal distinction that the UNGPs
focus on businesses, distinguishing between their compliance with all
applicable laws and respect for human rights. This twofold distinction, I
argue, entrenches a state-centered concept of law in the very move by
which it claims to move beyond it. Instead of taking this twofold
distinction for granted, I reconsider what we mean by a legal obligation,
linking it to certain structural features of legal orders of which state law
is one exemplar but by no means the only one. To the extent that we can
show that other configurations of these structural features are
possible-and in fact are already emerging-in a global context, we can
begin to imagine the kinds of transformations of legal authority that
would be required for a legal license to operate on a global scale, if one
assumes, as I do, that the emergence of something like a global state is
not in the cards.
To prepare the way for developing a concept of legal order that
connects what the UNGPs disconnect-state and business; compliance
with law and respect for human rights-I begin by examining the
presuppositions that govern the current debate about legal authority in
a global context. Indeed, there is wide-ranging agreement among
sociologists that economic globalization marks the crisis of two
distinctions that have structured the exercise of authority in territorial
government. The first is the public/private divide. We are witness to the
far-ranging privatization and marketization of functions that have

LEGAL AUTHORITY AND A SOCIAL LICENSE TO OPERATE

previously been the remit of state authority. 6 Private actors and market
mechanisms increasingly operate as the vehicles for social ordering, to
the detriment of state regulation. In particular, the notion of a common
or public good has come under increasing pressure to the extent that
both private actors and market mechanisms systematically tend to favor
particular interests. 7 Hans Kelsen's reminder of the ideological
character of the distinction between public and private law seems
particularly apposite: "[r]epresenting as absolute the opposition between
private and public law... creates the illusion that the field of public law
alone ... is the domain of political power, which is totally excluded from
8
the [domain] of private law," a domain usually portrayed as neutral.
Against the neutralization and depoliticization of private law and
private self-regulation, Kelsen reminds us that subjective rights are no
less political rights than civil and political rights conventionally
understood. Kelsen adds that
[to] distinguish in principle between a private nonpolitical sphere of the law and a public political sphere is
to obscure the fact that the 'private' law created in the
contract is no less the arena of political power than the
public law created in legislation and administration.
What we call private law ... is simply a particular form
of law, the form corresponding to the capitalistic
economic system of production and distribution; its
function, then, is the eminently political function of
exercising power.9
What gets endangered or even lost in the notion of private selfregulation is the reference to commonality or publicness concealed in
the "self' of self-regulation. Indeed, the identity at stake in self6. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION (1996) (examining the rise of private transnational legal codes and
supranational institutions within the global economy); SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY,
AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES (2006) (discussing
globalization in terms of the institutions originally developed for nations but that are now
contributing to the denationalization of those institutions).
7. See A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL
MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 1 (Steve Smith et al. eds., 2003)

("Today, forces of globalization and privatization are relocating the boundary between
private and public authority in international commercial relations and creating new
opportunities for private, corporate actors to exercise power and influence.").
8. HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 95 (Bonnie

Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., 1992) (1934).
9. Id. at 95-96.
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regulation does not simply mean that the subjects of lawmaking are the
same as the addressees thereof. 10 This would amount to collapsing
identity as selfhood (ipse) into identity as sameness (idem).1 The "self'
of private self-regulation, no less than the "self' of collective self-rule in
public lawmaking, refers to the reflexive relation whereby a manifold of
actors view and refer to themselves as a group, the members of which
jointly enact a norm in their shared interest. Christopher Kutz makes a
similar point in critiquing the methodological individualism of social
theories that reduce collective action to an aggregation of acts by
individual agents, each of whom posits and pursues her interests
independently of all others: "The self of self-government is a 'we', not an
'J."'12 Accordingly, a claim to commonality, to publicness, is built into the
notion of collective selfhood.
This insight makes a crucial contribution to a theory of authority
and authorization in the framework of territorial government: if the
reference to a common interest or good is the way in which a manifold of
individuals view themselves as a social group, then "public" and
"private" lawmaking are part and parcel of the single process by which
the members of a state rule themselves. Collective self-rule under
territorial government concerns the structure of lawmaking as such, not
merely one of its forms, and encompasses what legal doctrine calls
public and private law. What renders private self-regulation
authoritative in territorial government is not, or not merely, that the
private actors who enacted it are "the same" as its addressees; it is that
the norms they enact can be viewed, however provisionally and
defeasibly, as a concretization of the common good of the larger
collective of which they are a part. This means that norms enacted by
private actors can be viewed as the larger collective's own norms, as
norms it has authorized, and their acts of lawmaking as authorized acts
of lawmaking.13 It also means that acts of private actors can be viewed
10. See HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 280-81 (Max Knight trans., Univ.
Cali. Press 2d rev. ed. 1967) (1934).
11. See PAUL RIccEUR, ONESELF AS ANOTHER 2-3, 115-25 (Kathleen Blamely trans.,
Univ. Chicago Press 1992) (1990).
12. Christopher Kutz, The Collective Work of Citizenship, 8 LEGAL THEORY 471, 472
(2002).
13. The structure of authorization I envisage is clearly visible in Steven Schwarcz'
useful parsing of rulemaking into four categories according to the level of government
participation. They are divided as follows: (i) "rules originated and put into force by
sovereign governments"; (ii) "rules originated by private actors but put into force by
sovereign governments"; (ii) "rules originated and put into force by private actors
pursuant to government delegation"; and (iv) "rules adopted by private actors without
government sanction or enforcement." Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 Nw. U. L.
REV. 319, 324 (2002). While, in his view, only the last three are forms of private ordering, I
would argue that, from the point of view of authorization, the first three are on a
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as the collective's own acts, to the extent that they are in accordance
with-authorized by-the common good, as spelled out in human rights,
among other doctrines. By these lights, the license to operate of
businesses in the framework of territorial government is premised on
the institutionalization of the insight that the distinction between the
public and the private is itselfpublic.
Here, a second distinction comes into play: the distinction between
inside and outside. If the authorization of private actors and their acts
depends on their conception as particular actualizations of the common
good of the larger collective of which they are part, this reference to a
larger collective presupposes a spatial closure absent which one could
not identify the collective of which those actors and their acts partake.
In territorial government, publicness, in the sense of a common good, is
conditioned by a spatial closure, in the sense of a common space.
Conversely, a common space, in the sense of territorialgovernment, is
conditioned by a common or public good. Extending a license to operate
to businesses, which means authorizing their acts to the extent that
they are in accordance with the common good, presupposes a closure
that splits space into domestic and foreign places, and in that sense into
an inside and an outside. Crucially, what is at stake in this closure of
space into an inside is that it then becomes possible for state authorities
to establish what ought and ought not to take place-literally-in the
collective's common space. In other words, absent the closure of space
into a unity of legal places, it would not be possible for territorial human
rights government to draw the distinction between legal and illegal
behavior, including behavior that is in conformity with or in breach of
human rights obligations.
Economic globalization challenges this internal connection between
the public/private and inside/outside distinctions, a connection that is
implicit in the distinction between compliance with all applicable laws
and respect for human rights. This distinction also illustrates the
difficulties encountered by schemes of global governance in
conceptualizing and institutionalizing a form of authority that could
provide effective human rights protection when human rights violations
by business enterprises fall beyond the jurisdiction of the state in which
they are chartered, as is often the case with multinational
corporations. 14 In particular, there is widespread recognition of the
continuum, to the extent that (ii) and (iii) presuppose forms of validating the content and
procedure of private ordering.
14. Daniel Augenstein & David Kinley, When Human Rights 'Responsibilities'Become
Duties: The Extra-territorialObligations of States That Bind Corporations, in HUMAN
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO
RESPECT?, 271-94 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013).
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urgency of reclaiming the notion of a common good, of which human
rights are an integral part, as the yardstick by which to assess
businesses and their operation. 15 In the same way that the scope of
business operations by multinational corporations is increasingly global,
a social license to operate also demands that this license reflect a global
common good. It would seem, therefore, that realizing this
transformation demands overcoming the parochial distinction between
inside and outside with a view to institutionalizing a properly global
perspective on business and human rights. I argue, however, that
following this line of reasoning would in fact entrench a key
presupposition of the state-centered thinking about legal authority
which animates the UNGPs, and which its critics had hoped to leave
behind.
II.

GLOBALIZATION: TWO SENSES OF THE INSIDE/OUTSIDE DISTINCTION

A range of scholars assume that, in contrast with territorial
government, global governance calls for normative orders that organize
themselves in such a way that the distinction between inside and
outside loses all empirical and conceptual purchase. This distinction,
like the distinction between the domestic and the foreign, is a merely
contingent feature of some legal orders, not a feature that is constitutive
for legal orders in general. These scholars seek to capture this spatial
transformation with references to a "global perspective," the global
"scale"
of
law,
"supra-territoriality,"
"deterritorialization,"
"delocalization," "spaces of flows," and other such formulations.16 This
spatial transformation goes hand in hand with the emergence of
"overlapping" claims to legal authority, such that the state can no longer
claim exclusive and sovereign authority over the population located in
its territory. Accordingly, so the story goes, economic globalization
demands abandoning the assumption that spatial inclusion and
exclusion are necessary ingredients of legal order. On this view,
economic globalization cuts the necessary link between legal authority
and place, hence between legal authority and inclusion/exclusion, at
least to the extent that this is a spatial distinction.
This story about the spatial transformation wrought by economic
globalization is cause for celebration among the latter's defenders and
15. See generally DAVID KINLEY, CIVILISING GLOBALISATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2009).
16. WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW FROM A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2009); BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARDS A NEW LEGAL
COMMON SENSE (second ed. 2002); GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (Gunther Teubner ed.,
1997); MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY (second ed. 2010).
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for much handwringing among its detractors. Either way, it is the basso
continuo of contemporary legal and political theorizing about
globalization. Whatever its merits, this story conceals an ambiguity that
is of crucial importance to a proper understanding of legal authority in a
global context: one must distinguish between the two forms of the
inside/outside distinction. The first is the distinction between,
respectively, the domestic and the foreign. Emergent global legal orders,
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), supersede the distinction
between domestic and foreign legal spaces. There need be no quarrel
here: this is undoubtedly a contingent feature of legal orders, as a range
of contemporary theorists have pointed out.17 But there is a second form
of the inside/outside distinction that has largely escaped the attention of
the legal doctrine and theory but that is of decisive importance to a
viable account of globalization: the distinction between a legal
collective's own space and strange spaces.
These two forms of the inside/outside distinction are not identical.
Consider the WTO. Like a state, the WTO configures itself as a spatial
unity, even if of a very different sort: as a global market. Unlike a state,
however, the spatial unity of the WTO is irreducible to territoriality.
Indeed, the WTO organizes itself as a unity of legal places-a global
market-in a way that supersedes the domestic/foreign distinction
associated with states, regional orders such as the European Union
(EU), or even classical international law, to the extent that the latter
regulates relations between states. Yet, this does not mean that the
WTO has moved beyond the inside/outside distinction in the second
sense noted above. Indeed, global activists continuously challenge the
WTO as being highly exclusionary in its operation, inasmuch as the
enactment of a world market marginalizes nonmarketized spaces as
unimportant and irrelevant.1 8 Yet, these places shelter forms of
behavior that contest the normative criteria governing how the WTO
organizes itself as a global market. Think, for example, of direct action
by India's Karnataka State Farmers' Association (KRRS) against
measures of trade liberalization under the aegis of the WTO.19 By
mobilizing to occupy and destroy fields of genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) in the effort to preserve and revalorize "traditional"
peasant ways of life, the KRRS's direct action intimates a place that is
outside of the WTO, even though not in the sense of a "foreign" place.
17. See generally works by the authors found supranote 16.
18. See, e.g., Main Issues, VIA CAMPESINA, http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/mainissues-mainmenu-27 (last visited Nov. 1, 2015) (where the Via Campesina [International
Peasant's Movement] identifies their main issues of concern, several of which fall under
the aegis of the WTO).
19. RUTH REITAN, GLOBAL ACTIVISM 156-159 (2007).
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Instead, their direct action intimates a strange place, a place that, from
the KRRS's perspective, resists normative integration into the
differentiation and connection of places that the WTO calls its own
space: a global market. 20 This suggests that, in the very process of
constituting itself from a first-person plural perspective as a "we," the
WTO must organize itself as an inside, configuring the global market as
its own space by excluding other kinds of places that it deems irrelevant
and unimportant with a view to realizing its aim: fostering global trade
between its members. These marginalized places are intimated in forms
of behavior that contest, more or less radically, whether and how the
WTO distinguishes and connects places within the unity of a global
market.
International human rights regimes are no exception to this
fundamental sense of the inside/outside distinction. While claims to
universality are certainly raised on behalf of human rights, such claims
are the object of more or less radical contestation in a variety of ways.
This is not the place to discuss the arguments advanced by a range of
anthropological studies that human rights demand a historically
contingent set of preconditions that, even today, are contested by
alternative normative frameworks for social life. 21 But there are at least
two arguments internal to the human rights discourse itself that show
why positivizing these rights in a global legal order demands a spatial
closure that separates the own from the strange. The first is that
positivizing human rights in an international or even global legal order
requires a determination of the concept of humanity for legal purposes;
that is, a limitation of what is germane from a legal perspective as
constituting the commonality of "our common humanity." This
determination calls forth the possibility of irreducible conflict about
what constitutes the humanity of human beings. Consider, for example,
the human right to life in the context of abortion and euthanasia. If
human rights are a privileged focus of what John Rawls calls an

20. This discussion was previously published in Hans Lindahl, Reply to Critics, 16
ETHIcs & POL. 1001, 1011 (University of Trieste, 2014), available at http://www.openstarts.
units.it/dspace/handle/10077/10695.
21. A locus classicus, but by no means the only one, is Herskovits's rejection of "the
applicability of any Declaration of Human Rights to mankind as a whole," in a submission
to one of the commissions of the United Nations entrusted with establishing the
theoretical foundations of an international declaration of human rights. Am.
Anthropological Ass'n, Statement on Human Rights, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 539, 542
(1947) (drafted by Melville Herskovits). A particularly radical illustration of this strong
form of normative contestation of human rights is, arguably, the Islamic State. See
Graeme Wood,
What ISIS Really Wants, THE ATLANTIc (March
2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/38498.
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"overlapping consensus," 22 they are no less a privileged focus of what I
would dub an "overlapping dissensus." The second argument goes to the
heart of the debate about business and human rights. It is significant
that constitutions, in the course of positivizing human rights as
fundamental rights, also establish the possibility of limiting their scope
with a view to balancing individual rights and the common good. Could
it be otherwise within a global human rights regime, whatever its form,
in which trade-offs will be required between individual rights and
business operations, in light of what is deemed to be the appropriate
contribution that businesses can make to the global good? Any such
trade-off includes and excludes and is vulnerable to challenges that call
into question the commonality of the spatial unity claimed for a global
human rights regime under which businesses must operate. 23 In short,
both arguments show that it is necessary to give a content to what
counts as the commonality of the common space claimed for a global
regime of human rights. By determining the content of commonality in
one way, hence not in others, a global collective oriented to protecting
human rights opens itself up to the charge of having unjustifiably
marginalized behavior that has no place in the global collective yet
which raises a claim to a place of its own.
None of this is an argument against human rights or an argument
against demanding that businesses comply with human rights law. I
argue only that human rights regimes cannot deliver what they are
usually expected to deliver when claims to universality are raised on
their behalf: that they are applicable "everywhere," where "everywhere"
means a spatial unity that is no longer organized as an inside vis-&-vis
an outside. A claim to a global common good is precisely that: a
defeasible claim, no less so when the commonality of a global good is
fleshed out in terms of human rights.
These considerations suggest that, from the perspective of this
fundamental form of the inside/outside distinction, it makes no sense to
distinguish between "literal" and "metaphorical" forms of inclusion and
exclusion. Rights and obligations are always emplaced rights and
obligations, to the extent that they presuppose a reference to the
putative spatial unity a legal collective calls its own. Likewise, the
closure that gives rise to a spatial unity as an "inside" conditions the
possibility of distinguishing between legal and illegal behavior, in the
sense of behavior that is either emplaced or misplaced, that is, behavior
that ought or ought not to take place-literally-in the space a collective
22. JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-34, 150-54 (expanded ed. 2005).
23. See generally DAVID KINLEY, CILISING GLOBALISATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE

GLOBAL ECONOMY (2009) (providing a nuanced account of the role of businesses in
economic globalization).
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calls its own. Conversely, that a collective claims a space as its own, by
virtue of a closure that establishes it as a common space, is a claim to be
empowered to establish what counts as emplaced and misplaced
behavior within that space. If the distinction between legality and
illegality, between emplacement and misplacement, depends on the
closure of space into an inside, this spatial unity, and the rights and
obligations that accrue to actors within it, can be contested from
elsewhere. This "elsewhere" is comprised of places that have no place in
that spatial unity yet are places with which rights and obligations are
associated, which are in (sometimes radical) conflict with the rights and
obligations included in the contested legal order. In contrast to
emplacement/misplacement, what lies outside of a common space
manifests itself as dis-placed behavior. This casts new light on the
concept of legal space. In effect, legal space is not simply "geographical"
space; it is a normatively charged space in the sense that the law
organizes space by differentiating and connecting places as ought24
places.
Accordingly, economic globalization exposes the contingent
spatiality of territorial government, to the extent that it organizes the
inside/outside distinction in terms of the domestic and foreign places. A
theory and practice of authority whereby multinational companies can
be held accountable for human rights violations in the course of their
global operations cannot continue to rely exclusively on the distinction
between the domestic and the foreign. But this by no means justifies the
further thesis that the distinction between own and strange places is
also contingent. In this fundamental sense, the inside/outside
distinction is a necessary feature of all legal orders, whatever their
"scale" or content. Before proceeding to draw out the conceptual and
institutional implications of this thesis for a credible social license to
operate in a global context, I outline the concept of legal order which
subtends this strong thesis about spatial closure.

III. AUTHORITATIVE COLLECTIVE ACTION
The concepts of authority and of the authoritative ordering of
society appropriate to making sense of a social license to operate,
whether in a national or a global context, can best be elucidated in
terms of what I will call authoritative collective action (ACA). I argue
24. For a range of examples of this general feature of legal order, including nomadic
communities, Roman law, international law, multinationals, lex mercatoria,and cyberlaw,
see HANS LINDAHL, FAULT LINES OF GLOBALIZATION: LEGAL ORDER AND THE POLITICS OF

A-LEGALITY 44-76 (Martin Loughlin et al. eds., 2013).
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that this concept of legal order is sufficiently general to encompass a
wide variety of legal orders while also sufficiently discriminating to
allow for highlighting significant differences between a variety of such
orders. I will parse this concept into its two components: collective
action (the genus) and authority (the species).
Legal orders are a species of collective action, a form of action which
Margaret Gilbert succinctly captures with the integrative expression
"we together," in contrast to the aggregative or summative expression
"we each. '25 A number of features of collective action deserve closer
attention. First, legal obligations and sanctions are a species of the
entitlements and rebukes that emerge between participant agents in
the course of collective action-"relational" or "directed" obligations, to
adopt Gilbert's (and H.L.A. Hart's) vocabulary. 26 Second, the nature and
scope of legally relevant behavior, as well as the rights and obligations
that accrue to participant agents, are internally related to the
normative point of joint action: that which our joint act ought to be
about. Third, collective action and its normative point can be nested in
higher-order-hence more general-forms of collective action and their
respective normative points, in which case nested collective action must
be rendered consistent with the higher-order normative point. So, for
example, a franchise contract might be nested in the more
encompassing form of collective action called a state. Fourth, joint
action deploys a four-dimensional order: spatial, temporal, subjective,
and material. Depending on what we are doing together, collective
action selects and connects places (e.g., the places that make up a global
market), times (e.g., the proper sequence of actions in global trade),
subjects (e.g., the different kinds of persons required to engage in global
trade), and act-contents (e.g., the different activities involved in global
trade). Fifth, the point of joint action determines what is relevant and
important to joint action, hence what kinds of places, times,
subjectivities, and act-contents are relevant and important to realizing
the normative point of joint action, such that other possible
combinations are marginalized as irrelevant. In other words, collective
action in general, and legal collective action in particular, cannot
include certain spaces, times, subjects, and act-contents without also
excluding other spaces, times, etc., as irrelevant and unimportant. Here
is the answer to why social groups in general, and legal groups in
particular, cannot but organize themselves as an inside vis-&-vis an
outside. For what I have called a "strange outside" is nothing other than
25. MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 168 (2d ed. 1992).
26. MARGARET GILBERT, A THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION

40, 153-61

(2006)

(drawing explicitly on Hart's notion of relational obligations from his famous essay, H.L.A.
Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175 (1955)).
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the contestation of what counts as important and relevant with regard
to the commonality of a space, issuing from the domain of what has been
rendered irrelevant and unimportant. Finally, social orders are
mutable, which means that the rules that establish who ought to do
what, where, and when are a default setting of the normative point of
(nested) joint action.
Significantly, what we ought to do together-the normative point of
joint action under law-may itself be open to discussion and conflict, as
is the case with other forms of social groups. This follows from the fact
that there can be no inclusion in collective action that is not also
accompanied by exclusion. However, and in contrast to other social
groups, legal orders involve authorities that, acting on behalf of the
group, regulate and uphold participant agency with a view to realizing
the normative point of joint action.
The specific difference of legal collectives with respect to other kinds
of collectives turns on how questions about joint action are dealt with.
We are witness to a legal collective when certain questions are not left
over to the collective's members to decide for themselves: questions
about the normative point of joint action; about the rights, obligations,
entitlements, and responsibilities that arise in the light of that
normative point; about the consistency of participatory agency with
regard to the normative point of joint action; and, finally, about the
consequences that follow from inconsistency with that normative point.
In a legal order, these and related questions, especially if they are the
source of conflict, are settled by authorities who claim to act on behalf of
the whole, such that dissenters and reprobates are bound by that
decision. All of this makes for a relatively robust identity over time of
the legal group.
This is, to be sure, a strictly functional account of authority: an
account that tells us what authorities do. Notice, however, that this
account already paves the way for a normative conception of authority,
to the extent that authorities claim to act on behalf of the whole. Indeed,
if the authoritativeness of regulation necessarily involves a claim to
commonality, then this claim can be contested by challenging who and
what is to be included in and excluded from the whole. In short, the
normativity of authority comes to the fore in the fact that the regulation
of joint action is a response to the practical question that confronts a
collective at every turn: What ought our joint action to be about? I will
return to this shortly.
In the course of regulating group action, legal authorities articulate
general and particular rules that are the default setting of the
normative point of joint action. The concept of rules, as I use it,
accommodates a wide range of normative standards. It obviously
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includes legislation, administrative acts, and judicial rulings, no less
than international treaties, as one would expect in territorial
government. But it also includes, for example, model contracts as
deployed in certain sectors of lex mercatoria, the regulations drawn up
by international accounting organizations, technical regulations and
standards, all of which belong to the domain of global governance. 27 In
short, regulation, as I construe it, encompasses both "hard" law and
"soft" law, where the latter refers to "statements of principles,
guidelines, understandings, model laws and codes and declarations that
...
are 'neither strictly binding norms of law, nor completely irrelevant
28
political maxims."'
If this is what the regulationof joint action by authorities is about,
legal orders also typically involve authorities who uphold joint action,
meaning that they not only rebuke miscreants for breaching their
obligations under collective action but also take steps to ensure that
participating agents comply with joint action and its normative point. I
define compliance broadly, including but not limited to physical
coercion. It encompasses a wide range of means that authorities can
marshal against those who breach directed or relational obligations
with a view to bringing them into line with collective action and its
normative point.
This account of legal order is very broad. In particular, the ACA
model of legal order cuts across the distinction between territorial
government and global governance. ACA, as sketched out above,
accommodates the emergence of a slew of transnational or even global,
private, self-regulatory groups, as well as hybrid public-private forms of
governance. In particular, the mutually exclusive territoriality of states,
which is the point of departure of territorial human rights government,
is but a limiting case of a broader spectrum of possibilities that includes
the functional, regional, and global legal orders that emerge from the
uncoupling of law and state. Finally, the ACA model of law allows for
variable levels of robustness with respect to the identity of legal
collectives.
Notice that the ACA model of law includes multinational
corporations (MNCs). Certainly, MNCs are nested forms of collective
action to the extent that they are chartered in a given state and subject

27. Colin Scott, Regulating Global Regimes, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION 563-575 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2011).
28. A. Claire Cutler, Virgina Haufler & Tony Porter, The Contours and Significance of
Private Authority in International Affairs, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS 333, 367-68 (A. Claire Cutler, Virgina Haufler & Tony Porter eds., 1999).
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to the laws of the states in which they operate.2 9 But this is not the
whole story. Given the global scope of their operations, MNCs can take
up a first-person plural perspective that is irreducible to their nesting in
the states in which they operate. This first-person plural perspective is
often highly effective, even when the MNC's internal regulations violate
state law. For example, it is not surprising that the resistance of the
Ogoni people to the destruction of their lands by Shell's operations in
the Niger Delta was leveled against Shell itself and not merely against
the state of Nigeria. 30 Regardless of the role played by the Nigerian
government in repressing Ogoni resistance, it is clear that Shell
exercised and continues to exercise a level of autonomous decision
making in the pursuit of its global interests in a way that Nigeria
cannot adequately authorize or contain by way of legislation enacted
from its state-centered first-person plural perspective. 31
There are two general implications that follow from these
considerations. The first is that if, as I argue, globally operating
businesses are distinct legal orders, then, conceptually speaking, there
is no reason that their global operations should lie beyond the domain of
law, as assumed by the cardinal distinction between state and business.
Returning to Part I, the entrenchment of state-centered thinking about
law reflected in the opposition between state and business, and,
subsequently, between businesses' compliance with applicable laws and
respect for human rights, rests on a reductive understanding of the
concept of legal order. As a result, the ACA model of law offers a strong
conceptual defense of why MNCs can be treated as subjects falling
directly under the rule of international law, on par with states. Both
states and globally operating businesses are legal orders in their own
right. From the first-person plural perspective of authoritatively
mediated collective action, nothing justifies separating a state's
obligation to uphold human rights, as per the first pillar of the UNGPs,

29. See here the first pillar of the UNGPs, the first foundational principle of which lays
down that "[s]tates must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or
jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. This requires taking
appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse through effective
policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication." U.N. Human Rights Office of the High
Commissioner, supra note 1, at 3.
30. See, for example, Saro-Wiwa's speech during his trial for incitement to murder.
Ken Saro-Wiwa, Ken Saro-Wiwa's Final Address to the Military-Appointed Tribunal, 11
EARTH ISLAND J. 25 (1995).
31. I draw here on the excellent text by Daniel Augenstein, Paradise Lost: Sovereign
State Interest, Global Resource Exploitation and the Politics of Human Rights
(forthcoming; on file with the author); see also Michael Watts, Resource Curse?
Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria, 9 GEOPOLITICS 50-80 (2004).
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from a business's duty to respect human rights, as per the second
pillar.32
The second implication follows from the fact that, in the course of
their global operations, MNCs respond to the key practical question
confronting collectives-what ought our joint action be about?-in a way
that eludes nesting within the normative criteria of inclusion and
exclusion posited by state legal orders. This feature of MNCs is precisely
what the second pillar of UNGPs attempts to address in terms of the
appeal to "respect human rights," where respect, according to the
UNGPs, does not have the status of a legal obligation. 33 This exposes
the core problem that remains unaddressed by the second pillar of the
UNGPs as a result of its distinction between state law and non-law. The
recurrent tensions between shareholder and stakeholder interests;
between profits for shareholders and the social costs generated by MNC
operations; between the pursuit of profit over time and the
sustainability of life for this and future generations of sentient beings
all attest to the need for nesting collective action by MNCs within a
more encompassing social group commensurate with the global scope of
their operations. Only in this way can MNCs lay claim, normatively
speaking, to being not only an instance of authorized collective action
but also of authoritative collective action in the course of their global
operations. Accordingly, the ACA model of law offers a strong normative
defense of why MNCs should be treated as subjects falling directly
under international law, in particular as subjects of international
human rights law.
IV. A SOCIAL LICENSE TO OPERATE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT
I began with the question of how to make sense of, and lend traction
to, the preposition "of' in the claim that "business enterprises [are]
specialized organs of society."34 What credible sense can be given to the
notion of an authorization to businesses and their operations such that
society can view businesses as its own organs and their functions and
activities as its own functions and activities? The ACA model of legal
order provides a framework by which to assess what could be a credible

32. In contrast to the first foundational principle of the first pillar (see supra note 29),
Foundational Principle 11, pursuant to the second pillar, holds that "[b]usiness
enterprises should respect human rights. This means that they should avoid infringing on
the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which
they are involved." See U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, supra note
1, at 13.

33. See id.
34. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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interpretation of a social license to operate in a global context and
whether corporate "respect for human rights," as laid out in the UNGPs,
is consistent with such an interpretation. While the answer to this
question is relatively straightforward in the context of territorial
government, it is much less so in the context of global governance, in
which the territorial forms of the public/private and inside/outside
distinctions have lost empirical purchase.
The clue to a general answer is already enclosed in the question
itself. For at issue is not society as a more or less amorphous and
anonymous mass of individuals; at issue is the emergence of the firstperson plural perspective of a "we" in joint action. If there is to be a
social license to operate, then the referent of "social" is not "society"; it
has to be a social group-a plural subject. This means that a social
license to operate demands that it be possible to view businesses as
actors participating in collective action and their acts as participant acts
from the perspective of a "we." In other words, to say that businesses
are authorized to act is to acknowledge that the members of the group
can view business operations as part and parcel of what we, the social
group, are doing together with a view to realizing the normative point of
our joint action. To the extent that a business is a social participant
because it contributes to realizing what the group's action is about, the
social group can call the business's operations its own. What is required
is to nest the global operations of MNCs in higher-order collective
action. Such nesting is possible, or so the ACA model of law argues,
because MNCs, as distinctive legal orders irreducible to the states in
which they operate, are distinct legal subjects capable of falling under
the aegis of international law.
What is at stake here is not primarily a legal sense of ownership, for
example, a property right. Instead, what is primarily at stake is the
notion of ownership implied in a reflexive form of collective identity and
identification. By these lights, the fundamental form of ownership
evoked by referring to a business's operations as "our own" is the notion
of empowerment. To authorize is to empower, to open up a repertoire of
practical possibilities concerning who ought to do what, where, and
when with a view to realizing the point of joint action. Property rights
are forms of legal empowerment and so also the right to contract. Both
are particular legal manifestations of the reflexive form of collective
identification presupposed in calling an actor or an act our own; that is,
an actor or an act that we, as a social group, have authorized or
empowered. Likewise, to disallow or to disqualify an act, to deny it the
character of a participating act or actor, is to disown it, to gainsay that
it fulfills our expectations of what our joint action is about.
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The emergence of the first-person plural perspective of a social
group, therefore, is the general condition that must be met such that
one can meaningfully speak of a social license to operate, whether in the
context of territorial government or of global governance. This condition
also explains why the public/private and inside/outside distinctions
remain the indispensable preconditions of a social license to operate in
the context of global governance.
Taking the former distinction first, the claim to a public or common
good is built into the very concept of ACA, in particular into the properly
normative notion of authority presupposed in its functional
interpretation as regulating and upholding collective action. Not only
are participating agents to act together; their collective action is also
premised on what are deemed to be mutual expectations about what
their joint action ought to be about: the normative point of their action.
The reference to mutual expectations, hence the claim to generality
made on behalf of legality, is crucial because the UNGPs' reference to
"social expectations" is incapable of making sense of the publicness
proper to ACA, absent which all talk of authorizing or licensing
businesses to operate is disingenuous. As David Bilchitz points out,
"social expectations" is a normatively underdetermined concept because
members of a society can entertain very different, even conflicting,
expectations of corporate behavior. 35 His objection can be recast, from
the perspective of the ACA model of law, in the following way: social
expectations do not give rise to directed or relational obligations,
without which there can be no meaningful talk of a social license to
operate. No commonality, no publicness, follows from the invocation of
social expectations; the notion takes us no further than an aggregative
interpretation of the pronoun "we" as "we each." It is this
methodological individualism that animates attempts to privatize and
marketize public 'authority. Commonality only comes into the picture
with claims to reciprocity, hence with references to a normative point
that is deemed to determine what binds us together as a social group:
"we, together." But the emergence of a social group, and of the relational
or directed obligations on which it thrives, requires a closure that gives
rise to a bounded common good. No less than in a state-centered
context, in a global context a social license to operate involves a
determinate legal default setting with respect to the key practical
question confronting the members of a collective: what ought our joint
action be about? What I call the "nesting" of MNCs in a global social
35. See David Bilchitz, A Chasm Between 'Is' and 'Ought?A Critique of the Normative
Foundations of the SRSG's Framework and the Guiding Principles, in HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT? 107,

119-23 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013).
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group is nothing other than the process by which they are empowered to
act in accordance with the default setting of that group's normative
point.
If, as I argue, there can be no ACA without a bounded common good,
it becomes clear why a social license to operate in a global context
cannot do without the spatial distinction between inside and outside
and why the way in which a global ACA would draw this distinction is
vulnerable to challenge. Indeed, the emergence of the first-person plural
perspective of a social group requires a determinationof our common or
joint good. This demands a spatial closure that includes and excludes.
Although the emergence of a global ACA does not organize itself
spatially as the distinction between the domestic and the foreign, it
could not distinguish between behavior that is legal or illegal, emplaced
or misplaced, absent a closure that marks off an inside as the space a
collective deems its own, hence a space that orders behavior in terms of
whether it lives up to or is in breach of inter alia human rights
obligations. As exclusion, the closure that inaugurates the first-person
plural perspective of a global ACA relegates everything that is beyond
the pale of joint action and its normative point to the residual domain of
the unordered. Accordingly, the emergence of a common space, a global
space we can call our own because it is the spatial unity that
differentiates and interconnects the kinds of places that are relevant
and important to realizing the point of our joint action, goes hand in
hand with the marginalization of places that are deemed irrelevant and
unimportant. The latter can manifest themselves as an outside,
intimating another way of organizing space as a common space that
calls for realization through behavior that challenges the commonality
claimed for what a global collective calls its own legal space. This would
be the case, for example, for behavior that contests how a global ACA
determines the content of human rights with respect to business
operations.
In short, the emergence of a global first-person plural perspective
demands a collective self-emplacement by way of a spatial inclusion and
exclusion. And this collective self-emplacement is the condition required
for authorization as a spatial authorization, a where-empowerment,
such that acts and actors can appear as emplaced or misplaced, hence as
allowed or disallowed, against the backdrop of an outside that manifests
itself in acts that appear as dis-placed, as dis-empowered.
Accordingly, the twofold condition for authority in territorial
government continues to operate, albeit in a transformed manner, as
the twofold condition for a viable concept of legal authority in global
governance. Indeed, a social license to operate presupposes that in
global governance, publicness, as the common good, is conditioned by a
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spatial closure: a common space. Conversely, a common space, in the
sense of global governance, is conditioned by a determinate common or
public good. Extending a license to businesses to operate globally, which
means authorizing their acts to the extent that they are in accordance
with the common good, presupposes a closure that splits the face of the
earth into an inside and an outside in the sense of the own and the
strange, and vice versa. Contrary to what the literature on global
governance would have us believe, the problem raised by business and
human rights is not to reconstruct authority beyond the inside/outside
divide. It is precisely the opposite: how to bring about a spatial closure
that allows for opening up the world as a common space organized
according to the distinction between emplacement and misplacement,
legality and illegality, such that human rights can take hold as directed
or relational obligations.
To summarize, the connection between a bounded common good and
a bounded common place is both the condition and the object of
authority in global governance. Because the disparateness of "social
expectations" shows that every default setting of the common good is
deeply contentious, there can be no credible social license to operate in a
global context absent authorities that uphold and regulate joint action
with respect to what counts as a global collective's bounded common
good and as its bounded common place. If this authoritative feature of
ACA is lacking, the preposition "of' in the UNGPs inaugural claim that
"businesses [are] specialized organs of society" is empty of content. Yet,
this is the very feature that the UNGPs preclude when proclaiming that
the corporate responsibility to respect human rights does not create a
legal obligation in its own right, in the broad sense of the expression
apposite to ACA: an authoritatively mediated relational or directed
obligation.
This crucial feature of a credible social license to operate in a global
context is brought home if we contrast the UNGPs to the OECD's
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (GMEs). The GMEs are
''recommendations
addressed by governments to multinational
enterprises operating in or from adhering countries. They provide nonbinding principles and standards for responsible business conduct in a
global context consistent with applicable laws and internationally
recognised standards." 36 Crucially, the National Contact Points (NCPs),
established by the governments who have adhered to the GMEs, "assist
enterprises and their stakeholders to take appropriate measures to
further the implementation of the Guidelines. They also provide a
mediation and conciliation platform for resolving practical issues that

36. OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 3 (2011).
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may arise."37 The aim of the NCPs is to "further the effectiveness of the
GMEs," 38 to which end the GMEs put in place a procedure for
implementation that concludes, in the case of continued disagreement
between the parties involved, with a statement that lays out the issue at
hand, why the NCP decided to examine it, the procedure used, and
recommendations to the parties on the implementation of the GMEs.
39
The statement is made public.
We have here, I submit, a case of emergent ACA in the framework of
global governance. There is collective action in which multinational
enterprises are viewed as participating agents engaged in operations
that are authorized to the extent that they contribute to realizing the
normative point of joint action; there are authorities who are entrusted
with regulating the normative point of joint action, both by way of
general and particular rules, albeit in the form of soft law; and there are
mechanisms in place oriented to pushing parties in breach of the GMEs
to comply with them. In a careful and innovative study of DAS Air and
Afrimex, two cases brought before the United Kingdom NCP by civilsociety actors, Larry Cati Backer shows how, in both cases, the NCP
was able to regulate behavior effectively through mechanisms of soft
rather than hard law: "The technical monopoly power of the state over
law was not affected by regulatory systems that do not bind in law and
could thus have an equivalent effect, at least as far as the entity subject
to NCP proceedings is concerned." 40 In fact, these two cases point to an
autonomous "normative system in the making," and mark "another step
in the reconstitution of supranational governance and the allocation of
41
governance rights and obligations."
While CatA Backer follows the traditional distinction between hard
and soft law in this passage, what interests me is that his analysis of
these two cases offers a concrete illustration of the general structure of
ACA, a structure that cuts across the distinctions between territorial
government and global governance and between hard and soft law,
while also showing the core features of authority that must be retained
in the latter, if we are at all to make credible sense of a social license to
operate in a global context. On one hand, there are authorities that
regulate and uphold the normative point of joint action, even if in ways
that are different from those marshaled by territorial states. On the

37. Id.
38. Id. at 68, 71
39. Id. at 72-74.
40. Larry CatA Backer, Small Steps Towards an Autonomous Transnational Legal
System for the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 10 MELB. J. INT'L L. 258, 288
(2009).
41. Id. at 266.

LEGAL AUTHORITY AND A SOCIAL LICENSE TO OPERATE

other hand, there are actors who can raise allegations of breaches of the
standards contained in the GMEs. Through their interventions, the
NCPs and the organizations of civil society effectively claim to represent
a global plural subject; they take up the first-person plural perspective
of a global "we" when demanding that multinational enterprises live up
to the standards that are the default setting of that social group's
normative point.
This representational claim aims, on one hand, to reconstitute the
public/private divide, insofar as acts by multinational enterprises are
deemed to be authorized only to the extent that they can be viewed as
concretizations of a bounded-albeit global-common good, as laid down
in the regulations of the GMEs. In fact, it would be more adequate to
say that these representational claims seek to reconstitute the
public/private distinction as public. On the other hand, their
interventions aim to reconstitute the inside/outside distinction by way of
a bounded-albeit global-common space, a space that is our own to the
extent that "we," the global community they seek to represent in the
very process of creating it, claim to be entitled to establish what ought
to take place therein by defining behavior that is emplaced or misplaced
to the extent that it either lives up to or is in breach of human rights
obligations. If the allegations of breaches of the GMEs leveled by civil
society against multinational enterprises contest what has been
included and what has been excluded from the common space of the
global GME community, the recommendations by the NCPs and by the
Investment Committee of the GMEs contribute to recalibrating the
bounded common good of that collective, as laid down in the regulations
42
that constitute its default setting.
CONCLUSION

The ACA model of law suggests that this is one of the ways, no
doubt still very modest, by which it might begin to become credible to
assert, in a global context, that businesses are specialized organs of
society and that a corporate responsibility to respect human rights is an
authoritatively mediated relational or directed obligation. Against the
entrenchment of state-centered thinking of law that follows from
opposing states to businesses, and then opposing a business's obligation
to comply with applicable law and social expectations that it respect
human rights, the ACA model of law unifies what the UNGPs separate.

42. The Investment Committee operates, generally speaking, as a forum for
consultations about the GMEs, including their clarification, with a view to ensuring the
effective functioning thereof. See OECD, supra note 36, at 68-69.
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ACA argues, first, that businesses are no less legal orders in their own
right than states; and second, that because the domain of legal
obligations is coextensive with ACA, all activities of globally operating
businesses are subject to international human rights law. To move
beyond state-centered thinking about law, in response to violations of
human rights by globally operating businesses, is to acknowledge that
there is one pillar that embraces states and businesses: the legal
obligation to comply with international human rights law.

